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Abstract 
 
With the dividend-paying culture increasingly taking hold in corporate Taiwan, this paper 
investigates the effects of industry peers on the corporate dividend policies in the country. By 
employing the instrument variable technique, we find strong evidence that the payout policies of 
Taiwanese firms are positively influenced by the policies of their industry peers. This peer 
influence tends to be stronger for companies operating in industries with lower product 
competition and higher information uncertainty, indicating that firms imitate the dividend 
policies of their peers for information-based reasons. Younger, smaller and harder-to-value 
companies are also more likely to mimic their larger, older and easier-to-value peers. Our 
findings are robust to alternative definitions of control variables, instrument variable and 
industry classifications. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In their pivotal paper, Modigliani and Miller (1961) argued that in a world of perfect 
information, full capital mobility, no taxes and no agency costs, the payout policy of a company 
should be irrelevant to its firm value. However despite their irrelevance theorem, the existence 
of imperfect capital markets in the real world means that dividend policy continues to be a hotly 
debated subject in corporate finance literature. Over the last few decades, extensive studies have 
been performed to better understand the various determinants of firm payout ratios, and several 
hypotheses have been put forward to explain corporate dividend policy, including the catering 
theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2004), tax preference hypothesis (Miller and Scholes, 1978), the 
demographics clientele theory (Lee, 2011) and the retail minority shareholder hypothesis (Lee, 
2010).  
 
In recent years, a particular strand of research has emerged that focuses on investigating 
the influence of industry peers on corporate financial policies. Studies into peer effects are 
however not new in academia, and much of the pioneering work on peer effects had originally 
be done in the field of education economics. For example, in one of the more widely-cited 
research, Hoxby (2000) found that students are significantly affected by the achievement level 
of their peers. When exposed to an unusually low achieving cohort, good students often end up 
scoring lower marks themselves, while low achievers who are being surrounded by high 
achievers frequently do better. Interestingly, the effects of peers are not just confined to the 
classroom. A study of the workplace by Mas and Moretti (2009) yielded similar results. When 
they analysed data from a large supermarket chain, they found strong evidence that the 
productivity of a worker is dependent on the productivity of his/her coworkers in the same team. 
By introducing a highly productive personnel into a shift, the productivity of the overall team is 
greatly enhanced as the positive productivity of that individual spills over. 
 
Within the field of corporate finance, the seminal paper by Leary and Roberts (2014) is 
perhaps one of the first to extend the study of industry peer effects to company financial policies. 
When they looked at 9,126 US firms over the period of 1965 to 2008, Leary and Roberts (2014) 
found that the financing decisions and, to a lesser degree, the characteristics of peer firms2 are 
important determinants of firm capital structures. In particular, they observed that smaller, less 
successful firms are highly sensitive to their larger, more successful peers, although the reverse 
is not true. When Adhikari and Agrawal (2018) expanded the investigation to the payout policies 
 
2 Leary and Roberts (2014) and Adhikari and Agrawal (2017) define peer groups based on their three-digit SIC 
industry codes. 
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of US public firms, they found robust evidence of firms’ payout policies being significantly 
influenced by the policies of their industry peers. 
 
It is clear that deeper research in this field, especially on the effects of peers on dividend 
policies, will be very interesting. This is particularly true for Taiwan, a country traditionally 
celebrated for its semiconductor and technology hardware prowess, and where the topic of 
dividend policy has always been controversial. This is because technology companies have 
historically balked at paying more than token dividends in lieu of financing the rapid growth of 
their own operations, and most managers have often viewed dividend payments as an ultimate 
admission that the growth phase is over. In a market where technology firms make up close to 
half of the total capitalisation, it is therefore not surprising that dividend-paying companies were 
the minority during the late-1990s. However over the last two decades, the dividend-paying 
culture in Taiwan picked up significantly (Figure 1). By the middle of 2016, the Taiwanese 
market was already boasting a hefty average dividend yield of 4.69%, with the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange (TWSE) particularly calling out the yield premium of the country over several major 
markets in the Asian region as well as its relative attraction to investors3. In fact in early 2017, 
the TWSE started disclosing, for the first time, the average cash dividend yield on the local main 
board on a monthly basis, a move that also brings it in line with international practice. In 
explaining the change, the TWSE highlighted that “with more listed companies on the local 
equity market preferring to give cash dividends to shareholders, like their international 
counterparts, the exchange now discloses the cash dividend yield to investors each month”4. 
Given the rising importance of dividends in the Taiwan equity market, a richer understanding of 
the determinants of corporate payout policy in the country, especially the role of peer effects, 
will be of great importance. This paper also adds to current literature by investigating the 
influence of peers on dividend policies within an institutional framework that mostly constrains 
the use of share buybacks. In the study by Adhikari and Agrawal (2018) for example, the focus 
had been on the US market where companies can freely utilise both dividends and share 
repurchases as their payout tools. According to them, firms can therefore sometimes deflect peer 
pressure to initiate dividends by repurchasing shares. Firms in Taiwan are however unlikely to 
do the same as share repurchases were prohibited until 19 July 2000. Even after they were being 
allowed, there were still major restrictions imposed on its use. These restrictions include limiting 
the accumulated repurchased shares to 10% of the outstanding shares, as well as confining the 
maximum number of shares permitted for each repurchase to 2% of the registered number of 
shares. In addition, the decision by the Taiwanese government in the beginning of January 2008 
to treat the bonuses of employees as an expense is also widely believed to have affected 
companies’ decisions to repurchase shares. Without share repurchases as a viable alternative 
payout tool, this should imply that peer influence on dividend policy will be more pronounced. 
An investigation of the peer effect within the Taiwanese market is therefore of interest. 
 
3 http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2016/07/02/2003650133 
4 http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201702110026.aspx 
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This paper therefore sets out to investigate the effects of peers on the dividend policies 
of Taiwanese companies. Casual empiricism certainly suggest that peer dividend policies exert 
strong influences on Taiwanese corporates’ payout policies. For example, Ejinsight5 reported in 
2014 about how “contract manufacturer Hon Hai Precision […] is coming under intense pressure 
from big shareholders to boost dividends” as the company only “paid out 19 percent of its 2013 
profit to shareholders compared with an average of 60 among a group of Taiwanese peers 
including fellow Apple assembler Pegatron Corp and personal-computer Compal Electronics”. 
Meanwhile, when President Wu Ching-Tien of Taiwanese petrochemical giant Taiwan Styrene 
Monomer presented 6  to his shareholders in January 2019, he specifically compared his 
company’s dividend yield to its peers, Grand Pacific Petrochemical and Formosa Chemical & 
Fibre, in order to highlight its stronger financial performance. This likely reflects the importance 
of peer dividend policies when the company is considering its own payout policy. This paper 
looks at 971 companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange over the period of 1995 to 2017, 
and employs the instrument variable technique to overcome the identification posed by regressor 
endogeneity before performing its regression analyses. We find that the payout policies of 
Taiwanese firms are significantly and positively influenced by the policies of their industry peers. 
Our conclusions are robust to alternative definitions of control variables, instrument variable and 
industry classifications. We then extend our analysis to understand the reasons driving this peer 
influence, and find evidence that companies imitate their peers for information-based reasons. 
In particular, younger, smaller and harder-to-value firms are more likely to mimic the dividend 
policies of their older, larger and easier-to-value peers. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the data sample and 
methodology pursued in this paper including the construction of the instrument variable, while 
Section 3 reports the empirical results and the robustness checks performed. Section 4 delves 
into the peers effects channels as well as the characteristics of mimicking and mimicked firms. 
We conclude the paper in Section 5. 
 
2. Data Sample and Empirical Methodology 
 
Our paper focuses on the companies in Taiwan, and our sample consists of all the firms 
listed on the Taiwan Capitalization Weighted Stock (TAIEX) Index between 1995 and 2017 that 
have non-missing data for the variables required in our relevant regressions. Company data is 
 
5 http://www.ejinsight.com/20141231-hon-hai-under-pressure-to-boost-transparency-dividends/ 
6 http://irtsmc.com/pdf/taiwan_styrene_monomer.pdf 
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obtained from Factset and Bloomberg. Detailed explanations of the variables used in this study 
are found in Appendix A. 
 
2.1. The Empirical Model 
 
We employ an empirical model that is consistent with Adhikari and Agrawal (2018) and 
Grennan (2018): ܦ݅ݒ௜௝௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ 	ߚܦଓݒതതതതതି௜௝௧ ൅	ߛᇱ തܺି௜௝௧ ൅ 	ߣ′ ௜ܺ௝௧ 	൅ 	ߜ′ߤ௝ 	൅ 	߮′߭௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧     (1) 
where the indices i, j and t correspond to firm, industry and fiscal year respectively. The outcome 
variable ܦ݅ݒ௜௝௧ is a measure of the dividend policies of firm i in industry j in fiscal year t, while 
the covariate ܦଓݒതതതതതି௜௝௧ represents the peer firm average dividend policies. Peer firms are defined 
as all firms within the same industry except firm i. Industries are classified according to the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) Stock Industry Category. Because firms’ dividend policy 
decisions are influenced by one another, therefore firm i’s dividend policy is a function of firm 
j’s dividend policy and vice versa. This renders ܦଓݒതതതതതି௜௝௧ as an endogenous regressor, and leads 
to an identification problem which was first highlighted by Manski (1993) in his linear-in-
expectations model with social interactions. We resolve this through the use of instrument 
variables, a methodology also adopted by Leary and Roberts (2014), Adhikari and Agrawal 
(2018) and Grennan (2019). To limit the response time of firms influencing one another so as to 
identify the peer effects more cleanly, we use a contemporaneous ܦଓݒതതതതതି௜௝௧ measure. 
 
The vectors തܺି௜௝௧ and ௜ܺ௝௧ are the control variables representing peer firm averages and 
firm-specific characteristics respectively. We have specifically chosen the control variables that 
best represent factors commonly observed in academic literature to be important determinants 
of dividend policy, namely profitability, financial leverage, investment opportunities and size. 
 
Profitability is found in financial literature to influence dividend policy. Studies by 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) and DeAngelo et. al. (1992) observed that a large proportion of 
loss-making companies omit dividends entirely, while Jensen et. al. (1992) also found evidence 
of a positive relationship between the return on assets of firms and their dividend payouts. 
Following Jensen et. at. (1992), we use return on assets as a proxy for profitability and expect a 
positive relationship to dividend policy.  
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Financial leverage has been known to affect dividend policy as a result of the debt 
covenants and related restrictions imposed by debtholders (Higgins, 1972; McCabe, 1979). In 
particular, because paying dividends reduces the cash holdings of a firm, it results in greater 
reliance on external financing. As such, a firm with higher financial leverage will tend to choose 
a lower payout policy to lower its costs of external financing. In our paper, we use the ratio of 
long-term debt to equity as a proxy for financial leverage and expect a negative relation between 
financial leverage and dividend policy. 
 
The size effect is controlled here by the inclusion of the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization. Some studies have theorized that because large companies are typically better-
diversified businesses with limited future growth opportunities, they are therefore more likely to 
pay their free cash flows out as dividends. On the other hand, other studies have argued that the 
theoretical grounding for the influence of the size effect on payout policy is not robust, and have 
instead found a negative relationship (Allen and Michealy, 2003). As such while we include size 
as a control variable, we do not have particular expectations for its sign. 
 
Because investments and dividends compete for the use of the cash resource in a firm, 
the investment opportunity set is often negatively related to corporate payout policy (Gaver and 
Gaver, 1993). Following Kallapur and Trombley (1999), investment opportunities are measured 
as the realized growth in the firm’s assets in our paper. 
 ߤ௝ is the industry fixed effects,  ߭௧ is the year fixed effects and ߝ௜௝௧ is the heteroscedastic 
firm-specific error tern that is assumed to be correlated within the firm. ߙ, ߚ, ߛᇱ, ߣ′, ߜ′ and ߮′ 
are the regression coefficients, with ߣ′, ߜ′ and ߮′ capturing the first explanation for common 
industry behavior such as shared characteristics or the institutional environment, while ߚ and ߛᇱ 
measures the influences of peer firm actions and characteristics respectively on firm dividend 
policy choices. 
 
2.2. Construction of the Instrument Variable 
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As mentioned earlier, the main difficulty in using equation (1) to disentangle the various 
effects driving industry commonality in payout policy is in the presence of ܦଓݒതതതതതି௜௝௧ as a regressor 
due to its endogeneity. To resolve the ensuing identification problem caused by the simultaneity 
in firm and peer dividend policies, Leary and Roberts (2014) proposed a novel idea of first 
extracting the return shock in stocks. This is then used to calculate the exogenous peer firm 
characteristic which is finally applied as an instrument variable to identify equation (1). 
 
To do this, we first estimate the return shocks with an augmented market model for stock 
returns: ܴ௜௝௧ ൌ	ߙ௜௝௧ ൅	ߚ௜௝௧ெ௞௧ܯܭ ௧ܶ ൅	ߚ௜௝௧ூே஽൫ തܴି௜௝௧ െ	ܴܨ௧൯ ൅ ߚ௜௝௧ுெ௅ܪܯܮ௧ ൅	ߚ௜௝௧ௌெ஻ܵܯܤ௧ ൅	ߚ௜௝௧ௐெ௅ܹܯܮ௧ (2) 
where ܴ௜௝௧ is the total return for firm i in industry j over month t, ܯܭ ௧ܶ is the excess return on 
the market, ܪܯܮ௧ is the value factor, ܵܯܤ௧ is the size factor, ܹܯܮ௧ is the momentum factor, 
and ൫ തܴି௜௝௧ െ	ܴܨ௧൯ is the excess return on an equal-weighted industry portfolio excluding firm 
i’s return, with industries being defined by the TWSE Stock Industry Category. It is worth noting 
that while ൫ തܴି௜௝௧ െ	ܴܨ௧൯ is not one of the Fama-French and Carhart risk factors, it is included 
in our augmented market model to remove any variation in returns that is common across firms 
in the same peer group. 
 
The regression equation (2) is estimated for each firm on a rolling monthly basis using 
historical monthly returns where we require at least 24 months and up to 60 months of historical 
data. The expected monthly returns are then calculated using the estimated factor loadings and 
the realized factor returns of the month, with the residuals being the idiosyncratic equity risk: Expected	return:	 ෠ܴ௜௝௧ ൌ	ߙො௜௝௧ ൅ ߚመ௜௝௧ெ௞௧ܯܭ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚመ௜௝௧ூே஽൫ തܴି௜௝௧ െ ܴܨ௧൯ ൅ ߚመ௜௝௧ுெ௅ܪܯܮ௧ ൅ ߚመ௜௝௧ௌெ஻ܵܯܤ௧ ൅	ߚመ௜௝௧ௐெ௅ܹܯܮ௧             (3) Idiosyncratic	return:	̂ߟ௜௝௧ ൌ		ܴ௜௝௧ െ	 ෠ܴ௜௝௧        (4) 
 
We finally compute the idiosyncratic equity risk as the logarithm of the standard 
deviation of the monthly idiosyncratic equity shock over the last one year (Adhikari and Agrawal, 
2018; Grennan, 2019). The peer average equity risk thus calculated is then used as the instrument 
variable for predicting peers’ dividend policies. 
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It is worth noting the two differences between our choice of instrument variable 
compared to that of Leary and Roberts (2014). Firstly, our augmented market model for stock 
returns expands on that used by Leary and Roberts (2014) to also include the Fama-French and 
Carhart risk factors as they have been shown by general corporate finance literature to be 
important drivers of stock return variation. Secondly, because idiosyncratic equity returns are 
not known to be relevant determinants of dividend changes, we have chosen to focus instead on 
idiosyncratic equity risk which is a known driver of dividend policy (Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009). 
 
3. Empirical Findings 
 
3.1. Summary Statistics 
 
Table I shows the summary statistics for our estimated factor regressions. Most of the 
regressions have a full five-year (60 months) window of historical data, with the average number 
of months per rolling regression being 57. The adjusted R-squared is also fairly high at an 
average of 0.435 and a median of 0.452, indicating that the Fama-French and Carhart factor 
models explain a reasonable proportion of the systematic variation in stock returns. The factor 
regressions exhibit positive loads to market, size, momentum and industry beta factors, and 
negative load to the value factor. Figure 2 shows the distribution in peer firm average 
idiosyncratic equity risk, with the unconditional mean being 3.321.  Table II displays the 
summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables used in our regressions. Our 
sample comprises of 971 unique firms and 11892 firm-year observations. 
 
3.2. Empirical Results 
 
Table III presents the results of our two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions of 
estimating equation (1). The dependent variable is indicated at the top of each column, with the 
coefficient estimates in the body and the respective t-statistics in parentheses below. The results 
for dividend payer, dividend payout and dividends-to-assets are in columns (1) to (3) respectively. 
The coefficients on the instrument from the first-stage regressions are shown at the bottom of 
the table, and they indicate that the industry average equity risk is strongly negatively correlated 
with the industry average dividend policy. This is consistent with the survey findings of Lintner 
(1956) and Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005). Their surveys have noted that there is 
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often a high degree of conservatism exhibited by corporates in the setting of dividends, which 
implies that dividends and risk are negatively related. 
 
The row at the top labeled “Dependent Variable” shows the estimated coefficient on the 
instrumented peer firm outcome variable i.e. ߚመ . For all the dividend measures, our results 
indicate that firms’ dividend policies are significantly positively influenced by the dividend 
policies of their peers. For example, when peer firms increase the dividend payout by 1%, a 
company is also likely to raise their dividend payout by 0.926%. This also means that for a one-
standard-deviation increase in the dividend payout of peer firms, a company is likely to raise its 
own dividend payout by 0.475 standard deviations. Similarly, when peer firms raise their 
dividends-to-assets by 1%, a corporate is more likely to increase its own ratio by 0.803%. In 
other words, a company is likely to improve its dividends-to-assets by 0.386 standard deviations 
for a one-standard-deviation increase in the dividend policy of its peer firms. Our results 
therefore show that peer effects play an economically significant role in determining variation in 
corporate dividend policies. The signs for the various firm-specific control variables are also as 
theorized in corporate finance literature, with the dividend policies of firms being positively 
related to the firms’ profitability and size, and negatively related to its investment opportunities, 
leverage and idiosyncratic equity risk. 
 
It is worth noting here that our analysis using 2SLS hinges critically on the instrument 
chosen being useful and appropriate. There are two tests we employ to examine this here. The 
first test is to investigate for instrument relevance to determine whether our instrument is 
sufficiently strongly correlated to the endogenous variable, being the peer dividend policy 
variable. An F-test is performed and the result is shown in Table III.  We can see that for all three 
dividend policy variables, the test statistic is very large and significant at 1% level. The null 
hypothesis that the instrument is irrelevant is therefore rejected. Because the 2SLS technique 
should only be used if peer dividend policy is indeed an endogenous explanatory variable, we 
therefore also test for exogeneity by employing the widely-used Hausman-Wu test. We can see 
from the table that for all our dividend policy variables, the test statistics are extremely large. 
The null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity is therefore rejected at 1% significance level. 
 
 
3.3. Robustness checks 
 
In order to satisfy that our findings are robust, we conduct a battery of additional checks. 
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In our first robustness check, we adopt alternative measures of the control variables. In 
particular, we represent our measures of profitability, investment opportunities, size and leverage 
using Return-on-Equity, Book-to-Equity, Total Sales and Total-Debt-to-Total-Capital 
respectively. Columns (4) to (6) in Table IV shows our results. For both the dividend policy 
measures, the peer dividend policies remain statistically-significant positive determinants of 
firms’ dividend policies. 
 
In our second robustness check, we adopt an alternative augmented market model to 
describe stock returns. As noted earlier, the augmented market model employed by Leary and 
Roberts (2014) only uses two risk factors, namely the market premium factor and the industry 
risk factor, while our augmented model extends on theirs to also include the Fama-French and 
Carhart risk factors. Using the simpler model of Leary and Roberts (2014) and employing the 
same calculation methodology, we re-estimate the idiosyncratic equity risk for all the firms in 
our sample to calculate our alternative instrument variables. The results are exhibited in Columns 
(7) to (9) where we can see that peer influences remain economically important drivers of firm 
dividend policies. 
 
In our third robustness check, we adopt different industry classifications to define firms’ 
peer groups. While the TWSE Industry Stock Industry Categories classifies companies into 29 
different categories, the MSCI GICS Sector Classifications breaks the market universe down 
into ten sectors, which makes for coarser industry definitions and larger peer group sizes. 
Columns (10) to (12) shows the results of our estimates when the MSCI GICS Sector 
Classifications are being used to define the peer groups. Thus even under broader peer group 
definitions, it can be seen that peer influences remain positive significant factors influencing 
companies’ dividend policies. 
 
Our earlier results are therefore robust to alternative definitions of control variables, 
instrument variable and peer group classifications. 
 
 
4. Channels of and Heterogeneity in Peer Effects 
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4.1 Channels of Peer Effects 
 
Having established the significance of peer effects on firm dividend policy, it is important, 
at this point of the study, to distinguish the channels through which peer effects operate, 
particularly whether they are coming through the actions or characteristics of the peer firms. To 
better explain this point, we use an illustration that is analogous to the one provided by Leary 
and Roberts (2014). Imagine a hypothetical scenario where firm A undertakes a capacity 
expansion program which increases its idiosyncratic equity risk. In the following period, firm A 
cuts its dividends and retains more earnings in order to finance its higher capital expenditure. In 
response, peer firm B also reduces its dividend payout. In this case, is firm B reacting to the 
change in dividend policy of firm A, or is it responding to the introduction of new capacity in 
the industry (i.e. information about their peer that is embedded in the stock return and risk)? 
 
In order to distinguish between the two channels, we observe the heterogeneity in firms’ 
dividend policy responses to their peers’ equity risks. We do this by first performing a double-
sort of our data based on quintiles of our peer firm average equity risk and peer firm dividend 
policies. Within each quintile combination, we then compute the average dividend policies for 
firm i, and examine the pattern of changes across the quintiles. 
 
The results7 are shown in Table V where quintile “1” represents the highest 20% of the 
distribution and quintile “5” the lowest. The results are largely similar for the three dividend 
policy variables. For brevity, we will focus on the dividend payout variable here in Panel B of 
Table V. We can see, for example, that the average dividend payout among firms in the lowest 
peer firm equity risk and highest peer firm dividend payout bracket is 63.582% with a t-statistic 
of 70.386. There is also a clear monotonic decline across each row. This means that when the 
peer firm equity risk is held constant, the dividend payouts of firms decline as the payout ratios 
of peer firms fall. The converse is however not true, When we hold the dividend payout quintiles 
fixed, the average payout of firms are largely uncorrelated as the peer firm equity risk increases. 
This shows that firms will change their dividend policies in response to a change in peer firm 
equity risk only if it is also accompanied by a change in the peer firm dividend payout. When 
peer firm equity risk changes do not lead to a change in peer firm dividend policy, companies 
often do not alter their own dividend policies. 
 
 
7 While we perform this analysis for both dividend measures, we only present the results for dividend payout for 
brevity. 
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When we test the difference in means between the top and bottom quintiles by both peer 
firm average equity risk and peer firm dividend payout, we can also see that the differences are 
significant when the lagged peer firm average firm risk is being held constant for each quintile. 
On the other hand, the mean differences are not significant for three of the quintiles when peer 
firm dividend payout is being held constant. This again confirms that firms are responding to 
changes in their peers’ dividend policies instead of changes in their equity risk. 
 
4.2 Reasons for Peer Effects 
Having shown that Taiwanese firms’ dividend policies are influenced by that of their 
peers, we now try to identify the reasons for that in this section. We will be focusing on the 
payout variables of Dividend Payout and Dividend-to-Assets here for succinctness. 
 
Lieberman and Asaba (2006) highlighted two broad categories of theories behind the 
reasons why companies imitate each other: (1) information-based theories, where firms follow 
the peers who are perceived to have superior information, and (2) rivalry-based theories, where 
firms mimic their peers in order to limit rivalry or maintain competitive parity. In particular, they 
point out that firms are more likely mimicking their peers for rivalry-based reasons if all of the 
following three conditions are satisfied: 
Condition A: They compete in the same market or niche, and 
Condition B: The information environment is not high uncertain, and 
Condition C: They are of similar size or resource. 
 
Where any of the above conditions are not met, then it is more likely that firms are 
imitating their better-informed peers (i.e. information-based theory). Following the methodology 
of Adhikari and Agrawal (2018), we test these three conditions by investigating (i) the product 
market competition, (ii) the information environment, and (ii) the firm characteristics by age, 
size and asset tangibility. 
 
4.2.1 Product Market Competition 
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 According to Lieberman and Asaba (2006), when the product market is high, firms are 
more likely to mimic for rivalry-based reasons. This is because when an industry has many 
players or more homogeneous products, competition becomes stiffer as product differentiation 
gets more difficult. As such, there is a greater need for firms to mimic dividend policies in order 
to signal their own quality to the capital market. 
 
 To evaluate the degree of product competition in the industry, we adopt two widely used 
measures: the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) and the Lerner index (LI). The Herfindahl-
Hirschman index is calculated as a summation of the squares of the market shares of the firms 
in the industry, and its values can range from 0 to 10000 with larger index values indicating 
lesser competition. Panel A of Table VI Columns (13)-(16) shows the results of our analyses of 
the subsamples of firms that operate in more competitive (HHI < median) or less competitive 
(HHI < median) environments. The coefficients for the instrumented peer dividend policy 
variable in the 2SLS regressions are presented. It can be seen that the point estimates on the 
instrumented peer average policy variable is positive at 1% significance level among firms in 
less competitive industries. On the other hand, for firms in more competitive industries, the point 
estimate is not significant for the Dividend Payout variable, but significant for Div/Assets. 
 
 The Lerner index (Lerner, 1934), which defines a firm’s market power by its price-cost 
margin, is our second measure of product market competition. To obtain the industry Lerner 
index, we follow Karuna (2007) by dividing total industry sales by the industry total operating 
expenses. The index can take a value from 0 to 1. The closer an industry is to perfect competition, 
the higher the product substitutability and hence the lower the price-cost margin and the index 
value. Columns (17)-(20) in Panel A of Table VI shows the results of our regressions on 
subsamples of firms in more or less competitive industries. For companies facing low product 
competition, the point estimates for both peer policy variables are positive at 1% significance 
level, while the point estimates for companies facing high product competition are not significant. 
 
Overall, our results do not favour Condition A, and suggests that peer effects in corporate 
dividend policies are likely driven for information-based reasons. 
 
4.2.2 Information Environment 
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 Lieberman and Asaba (2006) found that information imperfection is a key driver of 
imitation among peers. In particular, they pointed out that firms operating in environments with 
higher information uncertainty tend to mimic their peers for information-based reasons. Because 
these firms have imperfect information on decision-making, they are more likely to actively learn 
from peers’ decisions as they believe that peers’ actions are conveying important information 
that guided their real decisions. 
 
 To measure the industry information environment, we use two measures: the dispersion 
in analysts’ forecasts and the industry average analyst coverage. Analyst earnings forecasts often 
contain information about the private information set observed of the analysts (Barron and 
Stuerke, 1998; Barron et al., 1998). As such, the greater the uncertainty faced by the analysts 
about the firm’s future economic performance, the higher the dispersion of forecasts. Following 
Zhang (2006), we calculate forecast dispersion for each company as the standard deviation of 
analyst forecasts scaled by the prior year-end stock price to mitigate heteroscedasticity. We then 
average that for all the firms in the industry to obtain the industry forecast dispersion. Panel B 
of Table VI Columns (21)-(24) show the results of our analyses on the subsamples of firms in 
industries with high and low information uncertainty. We can see that while the instrumented 
peer dividend policy variables are positive and significant drivers of corporate dividend policies 
of firms in both information environments, the point estimates are significantly higher for the 
companies operating under high information uncertainty. This appears to suggest that firms 
imitate their peers for information-based reasons. 
 
Because analysts are collecting, analyzing and distributing information about a 
company’s performance, therefore larger analyst coverage tends to correspond to more available 
information about the company, and hence less uncertainty. The second measure we use for 
estimating the industry information environment is therefore the industry average analyst 
coverage. This is calculated as the average monthly number of earnings estimates that firms in 
the industry receives over the fiscal year (Adhikari and Agrawal, 2018; Zhang, 2006). Columns 
(25)-(28) of Panel B in Table VI shows the results of the regressions on the subsamples. We can 
see that the coefficients of the instrumented peer dividend policy variables are positive and 
significant for firms operating in industries with low information uncertainty. However for 
companies operating under high information uncertainty, the coefficient for the instrumented 
peer variable is only significant for Dividend Payout, with the point estimate also being larger 
than that for companies under low information uncertainty. 
 
Our results are less conclusive here. While our regressions under the first measure are 
more indicative of information-based theory driving peer influence, our regressions using 
industry analyst coverage is not as supportive. 
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4.2.3 Who is Being Mimicked? Dividend Policy Leaders and Followers Based on Size, Age and 
Asset Tangibility 
 
 Based on the rivalry-based theory, in order to maintain their competitive parity to peers, 
companies are more likely to imitate the payout policies of their peers who are similar to them 
in size, age and ease-of-valuation. The information-based theory, on the other hand, predicts that 
smaller, younger and harder-to-value companies are more likely to mimic the policies of their 
larger, older and easier-to-value peers. We therefore investigate this by partitioning the sample 
into three terciles by size, age and asset tangibility separately, and then constructing the peer 
average dividend policy variables as well as the instrumental variables for the both the top and 
bottom terciles. The 2SLS regression is then performed on the subsamples. The proxies for size, 
age and asset tangibility used here are total sales, firm age from date of incorporation and net 
tangible assets to total assets respectively. 
 
 Columns (29)-(32) of Panel C in Table VI show the results of the 2SLS regressions on 
the subsamples of firms partitioned by size against the instrumented policy variables of both their 
large and small peers. We can see that for both the larger and smaller firms, the coefficients of 
large peers’ instrumented dividend policy variables are positive and significant at 1% level for 
both larger and smaller firms. Meanwhile, the coefficients of small peers’ instrumented policy 
variables are only significant for larger firms and not for the smaller ones.  We can also see that 
for the subsamples of larger and smaller firms, the point estimates of the large peers’ 
instrumented policy variable are generally also bigger and more significant than that of the small 
peers’ instrumented policy variable. Our results appear to point at the importance of large peers’ 
dividend policies in influencing the policies of all firms in the industry, and this is likely done 
for information-based reasons. 
 
 Columns (33)-(36) show the results for companies partitioned by their age. We can see 
that the older peers’ instrumented dividend policy variables are positive and significant drivers 
of the dividend policies of both older and younger firms. On the other hand, the coefficients of 
younger peers’ instrumented policy variables are only significant for older firms and not for 
younger firms. With the exception of the Dividend Payout variable for older firms, the point 
estimates of the older peers’ instrumented variables are generally also larger or more significant 
than that of the younger peers’ instrumented variables. Our findings here are also in line with the 
prediction of the information-based theory. 
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 Columns (37)-(40) show the results for firms subdivided by their net asset tangibility. 
While the instrumented Dividend Payout variable of less tangible peers is not a significant driver 
of the Dividend Payout of less tangible firms, the instrumented policy variables of both more 
and less tangible peers are positive and significant at 1% level for both more tangible and less 
tangible firms. For both subsamples, the point estimates of more tangible peers’ instrumented 
policy variables are also all significantly larger than that of less tangible peers. This suggests that 
firms mimic their more tangible peers for information-based reasons. 
 
 Overall, our findings suggest that Taiwanese companies mimic the dividend policies of 
their peers for information-based reasons, with younger, smaller and harder-to-value companies 
more likely to imitate their older, larger and easier-to-value counterparts. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 The Taiwanese market has been seeing a dramatic increase in payouts ratios and 
dividend-paying culture for some time. Over the last few years, the study of peer effects in 
corporate finance academia has also started to pick up. This paper therefore extends the study of 
peer effects to firm dividend policy in Taiwan. While studies of peer effects have historically 
been handicapped by the identification problem caused by the endogeneity in the regressor used, 
we overcome this issue by using the instrument variable technique. Our results show that the 
dividend policies of peers do influence the policies of companies significantly. In particular, we 
find that this peer influence is more prominent for firms operating in industries with lower 
product competition and higher information uncertainty. Smaller, younger and harder-to-value 
companies are also more likely to mimic the dividend policies of larger, older and easier-to-value 
firms. This is consistent with an information-based theory of imitation. Our findings therefore 
highlight the importance of understanding the payout policies of peer firms when evaluating 
corporate dividend policy. 
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Figure 1: Time Series Plot of Average Dividend Payout and Proportion of Dividend-Paying 
Firms in Taiwan 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Peer Firm Average Idiosyncratic Equity Risk 
The sample consists of all the firms listed on the Taiwan Capitalization Weighted Stock (TAIEX) Index between 
1995 and 2017 with non-missing data for all analysis variables. The figure shows the empirical distribution of the 
instrument variable, peer form average idiosyncratic annual equity risk. Peer firm averages are defined as the peer 
group average excluding the ith observation. 
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Table I: Stock Return Regression Results 
The sample consists of monthly returns for all the firms listed on the Taiwan Capitalization Weighted Stock (TAIEX) 
Index between 1995 and 2017. The table presents the mean factor loadings and adjusted R2s from the regression ܴ௜௝௧ ൌ	ߙ௜௝௧ ൅	ߚ௜௝௧ெ௞௧ܯܭ ௧ܶ ൅	ߚ௜௝௧ூே஽൫ തܴି௜௝௧ െ	ܴܨ௧൯ ൅ ߚ௜௝௧ுெ௅ܪܯܮ௧ ൅	ߚ௜௝௧ௌெ஻ܵܯܤ௧ ൅	ߚ௜௝௧ௐெ௅ܹܯܮ௧	 
where ܴ௜௝௧ is the total return for firm i in industry j over month t, ܯܭ ௧ܶ is the excess return on the market, ܪܯܮ௧ is 
the value factor, ܵܯܤ௧ is the size factor, ܹܯܮ௧ is the momentum factor, and ൫ തܴି௜௝௧ െ	ܴܨ௧൯ is the excess return on 
an equal-weighted industry portfolio excluding firm i’s return, with industries being defined by the TWSE Stock 
Industry Category. The regression is estimated for each firm on a rolling monthly basis using historical monthly 
returns data from the Factset database. We require at least 24 months of historical data and use up to 60 months of 
data in the estimation. Expected monthly returns are computed using the estimated factor loadings and realized 
factor returns of the month. Idiosyncratic equity shock is computed as the difference between the realized and 
expected returns, while idiosyncratic equity risk is computed as the standard deviation of the monthly idiosyncratic 
equity shocks over the last 1 year. 
 Mean Median Std devߙ௜௧ 0.157 0.103 1.633ߚ௜௧ெ௞௧ 0.246 0.229 0.683ߚ௜௧ூே஽ 0.750 0.725 0.812ߚ௜௧ுெ௅ -0.014 -0.017 0.210ߚ௜௧ௌெ஻ 0.144 0.076 0.814ߚ௜௧ௐெ௅ 0.006 0.009 0.479
Adjusted R2 0.435 0.452 0.192
No. of observations per regression 57 60 8 
Realised monthly return 1.007 0.000 13.691
Expected monthly return 1.142 0.902 9.125
Idiosyncratic equity shock (monthly) -0.043 -0.746 11.345
Idiosyncratic equity risk (monthly) 9.400 8.107 6.485
 
  
 22 
 
Table II: Summary Statistics 
The sample consists of all the firms listed on the Taiwan Capitalization Weighted Stock (TAIEX) Index between 
1995 and 2017 with non-missing data for all analysis variables.  The table presents means, medians and standard 
deviations (std dev) for variables in levels and first-differences. Peer Firm Averages denote variables constructed 
as the average of all firms within an industry-year combination, excluding the ith observation. Industries are defined 
by the TWSE Stock Industry Category. Firm-Specific Factors denote variables corresponding to firm i’s value in 
year t. All the variables have been winsorised at the 5th and 95th percentile level. 
  Mean Median Std dev 
Peer firm averages   
Dividend Payer 0.676 0.737 0.207 
Dividend Payout 48.013 50.732 17.296 
Dividends-to-Assets 2.671 2.881 1.503 
Return on Assets 5.062 5.199 3.140 
Asset Growth 1-year 6.603 6.032 10.885 
Market Capitalisation 8.661 8.618 0.682 
Long-term Debt to Equity 18.954 17.089 8.904 
Idiosyncratic Equity Risk 3.163 3.238 0.391 
Firm-specific factors   
Dividend Payer 0.674 1.000 0.469 
Dividend Payout 48.619 50.761 33.694 
Dividends-to-Assets 2.851 1.893 3.125 
Return on Assets 5.058 4.532 7.236 
Asset Growth 1-year 6.348 5.297 20.696 
Market Capitalisation 8.645 8.548 1.367 
Long-term Debt to Equity 19.082 8.712 24.159 
Idiosyncratic Equity Risk 3.321 3.343 0.521 
Industry characteristics   
No. of firms per industry-year 23.558 18.000 19.212 
Total no. of industries 29   
Sample characteristics   
Total no. of observations 11892   
Total no. of firms 971   
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Table III: Peer Effects in Dividend Policy: Structural Estimates 
The sample consists of all the firms listed on the Taiwan Capitalization Weighted Stock (TAIEX) Index between 
1995 and 2017 with non-missing data for all analysis variables.  The table presents two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimated coefficients, with the t-statistics shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is indicated at the top of 
each column. The endogenous variable is the peer firm average of the dependent variable. The instrument is the 
one-year-lagged peer firm average idiosyncratic equity risk. Peer Firm Averages denote variables constructed as the 
average of all firms within an industry-year combination, excluding the ith observation, and are lagged 1 year relative 
to the dependent variable. Industries are defined by the TWSE Stock Industry Category. Firm-Specific Factors 
denote variables corresponding to firm i’s value in year t. We also examine whether our instrument variable is 
appropriate through two tests: (1) instrument relevance using the F-test, and (2) exogeneity using the Hausman-Wu 
test. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by *, ** and *** respectively. 
  Dividend Payer Dividend Payout Dividends-to-Assets 
  (1) (2) (3)
Peer firm averages   
Dependent Variable 1.025* 0.926*** 0.803***
(1.848) (5.473) (5.821)
Return on Assets -0.031 -0.772*** -0.229***
(-1.433) (-3.189) (-6.115)
Asset Growth 1-year 0.000 0.308*** 0.013**
(-0.138) (3.642) (2.228)
Market Capitalisation -0.075*** -3.787** -0.355***
(-4.154) (-1.999) (-3.197)
Long-term Debt to Equity 0.002* 0.140* 0.014**
  (1.870) (1.751) (2.268)
Firm-specific factors   
Idiosyncratic Equity Risk -0.117*** -11.830*** -0.373***
(-12.766) (-16.980) (-8.017)
Return on Assets 0.031*** 0.596*** 0.321***
(49.040) (9.789) (88.873)
Asset Growth 1-year 0.001*** -0.205*** -0.015***
(5.037) (-10.678) (-11.217)
Market Capitalisation 0.054*** 3.185*** 0.161***
(15.790) (10.905) (8.819)
Long-term Debt to Equity -0.002*** -0.230*** -0.019***
  (-12.683) (-15.425) (-20.642)
First-stage instrument   
Peer Firm Average Equity Risk -0.059*** -8.901*** -0.347***
(-16.888) (-27.250) (-12.972)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.423 0.201 0.631
Total no. of observations 11840 9681 8643
Instrument relevance: F-test 40.486*** 121.52*** 278.43***
Instrument exogeneity: Hausman-Wu test 1.275e+29*** 1.034e+30*** 7.910e+28***
 24 
 
Table IV: Robustness Checks
Note: Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by *, ** and *** respectively. 
Alternative control variables Alternative instrument variable Alternative industry classification
Dividend Payer Dividend Payout Dividends-to-
Assets
Dividend Payer Dividend Payout Dividends-to-
Assets
Dividend Payer Dividend Payout Dividends-to-
Assets
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Peer firm averages
Dependent Variable 0.898*** 0.518*** 0.647*** 1.046* 0.931*** 0.804*** 0.600*** 0.600*** 0.835**
(3.126) (2.619) (3.398) (1.887) (5.496) (5.824) (4.712) (3.318) (2.453)
Return on Assets - - - -0.032 -0.774*** -0.229*** -0.015*** -1.021*** -0.251***
(-1.470) (-3.195) (-6.116) (-2.661) (-2.613) (-3.587)
Asset Growth 1-year - - - 0.000 0.301*** 0.013** -0.003** 0.065 0.003
(-0.220) (3.557) (2.191) (-2.450) (0.564) (0.288)
Market Capitalisation - - - -0.074*** -3.648* -0.349*** -0.035 -2.853 -0.042
(-4.091) (-1.924) (-3.141) (-1.580) (-1.391) (-0.245)
Long-term Debt to Equity - - - 0.001* 0.137* 0.014** 0.000 -0.011 0.016
(1.803) (1.711) (2.238) (0.278) (-0.087) (0.910)
Return on Equity -0.017*** 0.030 -0.066*** - - - - - -
(-2.927) (0.194) (-4.414)
Book-to-Equity 0.009 12.402*** 1.305*** - - - - - -
(0.370) (4.723) (5.618)
Total Sales -0.073*** -6.808*** -0.199* - - - - - -
(-4.402) (-4.138) (-1.677)
Total Debt to Total Capital 0.003* 0.158 0.014 - - - - - -
(1.860) (1.168) (0.941)
Firm-specific factors
Idiosyncratic Equity Risk -0.111*** -13.500*** -0.826*** -0.117*** -11.442*** -0.368*** -0.137*** -12.612*** -0.294***
(-14.309) (-19.305) (-16.399) (-12.970) (-16.745) (-8.019) (-18.646) (-18.126) (-6.451)
Return on Assets - - - 0.031*** 0.586*** 0.321*** 0.032*** 0.628*** 0.323***
(48.961) (9.623) (88.742) (56.359) (10.564) (88.574)
Asset Growth 1-year - - - 0.001*** -0.207*** -0.015*** 0.001*** -0.193*** -0.015***
(4.974) (-10.786) (-11.250) (5.551) (-10.052) (-11.560)
Market Capitalisation - - - 0.054*** 3.276*** 0.163*** 0.053*** 2.851*** 0.176***
(15.998) (11.229) (8.944) (18.867) (10.470) (10.021)
Long-term Debt to Equity - - - -0.002*** -0.230*** -0.019*** -0.002*** -0.218*** -0.020***
(-12.725) (-15.443) (-20.660) (-13.923) (-15.242) (-22.318)
Return on Equity 0.020*** -0.375*** 0.113*** - - - - - -
(67.950) (-7.237) (49.190)
Book-to-Equity -0.004 -11.749*** -1.908*** - - - - - -
(-0.509) (-11.639) (-28.114)
Total Sales 0.027*** 2.014*** -0.007 - - - - - -
(10.363) (7.346) (-0.400)
Total Debt to Total Capital -0.003*** -0.382*** -0.046*** - - - - - -
(-16.687) (-21.276) (-35.281)
First-stage instrument
Peer Firm Average Equity Risk -0.028*** -8.745*** -4.062*** -0.068*** -10.060*** -0.435*** -0.131*** -16.630*** -0.860***
(-9.280) (-26.207) (-15.743) (-19.568) (-31.180) (-16.343) (-31.456) (-45.165) (-33.964)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.501 0.221 0.599 0.422 0.200 0.631 0.438 0.220 0.641
Total no. of observations 11892 9746 8575 11840 9681 8643 11462 9411 8416
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Table V: Dividend Policy by Peer Firm Equity Risk and Peer Firm Dividend Policy 
The sample consists of all the firms listed on the Taiwan Capitalization Weighted Stock (TAIEX) Index between 1995 and 2017 
with non-missing data for all analysis variables. The table presents average dividend payout for 25 groups of observations. The 
groups are formed by the intersection of quintiles based on: (1) peer firm average equity risk lagged 1 year and (2) peer firm 
average dividend payout. The column labeled “1 − 5” presents the difference in means between columns 1 and 5. The row labeled 
“1 − 5” presents the difference in means between rows 1 and 5. t-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm dependence 
are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by *, ** and *** respectively. 
Panel A       
Lagged Peer Firm 
Avg Equity Risk 
Peer Firm Average Dividend Payer Quintiles   
1 (High) 2 3 4 5 (Low) 1 – 5
1 (High) 0.823*** 0.700*** 0.789*** 0.630*** 0.516*** 0.307***
  (37.986) (32.906) (54.304) (24.240) (18.100) 
2 0.809*** 0.741*** 0.666*** 0.713*** 0.456*** 0.353***
  (46.133) (38.491) (40.398) (49.524) (24.728) 
3 0.850*** 0.822*** 0.662*** 0.629*** 0.343*** 0.508***
  (55.754) (42.760) (25.637) (28.843) (17.689) 
4 0.762*** 0.810*** 0.757*** 0.632*** 0.355*** 0.407***
  (32.189) (51.987) (30.688) (28.609) (20.487) 
5 (Low) 0.851*** 0.773*** 0.789*** 0.664*** 0.419*** 0.433***
  (80.404) (53.244) (50.751) (32.064) (15.440) 
1 - 5 -0.028 -0.074*** 0.001 -0.034 0.098*** 
        
Panel B       
Lagged Peer Firm 
Avg Equity Risk 
Peer Firm Average Dividend Payout Quintiles   
1 (High) 2 3 4 5 (Low) 1 - 5
1 (High) 65.825*** 61.459*** 41.380*** 43.431*** 33.106*** 32.718***
  (34.942) (20.803) (24.955) (41.515) (19.690) 
2 54.64*** 60.126*** 47.670*** 41.885*** 32.768*** 21.871***
  (22.939) (34.900) (37.550) (31.473) (25.978) 
3 49.993*** 60.542*** 49.549*** 43.742*** 20.241*** 29.752***
  (18.17) (38.309) (52.799) (36.036) (18.403) 
4 63.430*** 62.318*** 49.451*** 34.682*** 24.559*** 38.871***
  (42.654) (45.385) (14.025) (16.381) (16.919) 
5 (Low) 63.582*** 62.924*** 52.864*** 42.641*** 36.386*** 27.196***
  (70.386) (67.74) (35.049) (18.1) (9.291) 
1 - 5 2.243 -1.464 -11.484*** 0.790 -3.280*** 
        
Panel C       
Lagged Peer Firm 
Avg Equity Risk 
Peer Firm Average Dividends-to-Assets Quintiles   
1 (High) 2 3 4 5 (Low) 1 - 5
1 (High) 0.034*** 0.045*** 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.011*** 0.023***
  (19.679) (23.599) (19.059) (10.650) (8.732) 
2 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.021*** 0.01*** 0.032***
  (23.784) (19.087) (19.155) (14.971) (7.041) 
3 0.049*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.046*** 0.006*** 0.044***
  (25.415) (14.548) (14.852) (9.429) (6.600) 
4 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.027***
  (14.591) (22.356) (24.109) (17.395) (12.288) 
5 (Low) 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.019*** 0.008*** 0.029***
  (30.918) (34.480) (26.405) (23.547) (8.860) 
1 - 5 -0.003 0.009*** -0.009*** 0.011*** 0.003*** 
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Table VI: Heterogeneity in Peer Influence 
This table presents two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimated coefficients, with the t-statistics shown in parentheses and the number 
of observations (N) in italics. The dependent variable is indicated at the top of each column. All models are estimated by linear 
2SLS where the endogenous variable is the industry average dividend payout and the instrument is the one-period-lagged industry 
average idiosyncratic risk. Industries are defined by the TWSE Stock Industry Category. All specifications include one-period-
lagged peer firm averages and firm-specific effects for the full set of control variables. Panel A focuses on the subsample of firms 
facing high or low product market competition, measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the industry Lerner Index. 
The sample of firm-years with above (below) median measures within a year is defined as that with low (high) product competition. 
Panel B focuses on the subsample of firms facing high or low information uncertainty, measured by the industry average analyst 
coverage and the industry average dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. The sample of firm-years with above (below) measures within 
a year is defined as that with low (high) information uncertainty. Panel C presents regressions for subsamples of larger, smaller, 
older, younger, more tangible and less tangible firms, partitioned into terciles based on the total sales, firm age and net asset 
tangibility. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by *, ** and *** respectively. 
Panel A: Product market competition and payout mimicking
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Lerner Index
High Product Competition Low Product Competition High Product Competition Low Product Competition
Div Payout Div/Assets Div Payout Div/Assets Div Payout Div/Assets Div Payout Div/Assets
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Instrumented Peer Div Policy Var 0.767 0.931*** 0.936*** 0.803*** 1.640 0.675 0.957*** 0.691***
(0.838) (3.009) (5.890) (3.491) (1.396) (0.737) (4.771) (4.483)
N 4703 4531 4978 4112 4211 4727 4432 4954
Panel B: Information environment and payout mimicking
Dispersion in Analysts' Forecasts Number of Analyst Coverage
High Info Uncertainty Low Info Uncertainty High Info Uncertainty Low Info Uncertainty
Div Payout Div/Assets Div Payout Div/Assets Div Payout Div/Assets Div Payout Div/Assets
(21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28)
Instrumented Peer Div Policy Var 1.183*** 0.871*** 0.785*** 0.568*** 0.985** -0.048 0.946*** 0.715***
(5.123) (4.522) (3.036) (3.06) (2.469) (-0.055) (4.360) (3.671)
N 4929 4221 4744 4394 5127 4234 4554 4407
Panel C: Who is being mimicked? Payout leaders and followers based on size, age and asset tangibility
Size Age Ease-of-valuation
Larger Firms Smaller Firms Older Firms Younger Firms More Tangible Firms Less Tangible Firms
Div Payout Div/Assets Div Payout Div/Assets Div Payout Div/Assets Div Payout Div/Assets Div Payout Div/Assets Div Payout Div/Assets
(29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (29) (40)
Large Peers' Instrumented Div Var 0.849*** 0.751*** 2.552*** 0.470** - - - - - - - -
(2.679) (4.315) (3.162) (2.016) - - - - - - - -
N 3920 3345 2477 2368 - - - - - - - -
Small Peers' Instrumented Div Var 0.371** 1.206*** 0.736 1.059 - - - - - - - -
(2.514) (3.564) (1.535) (0.81) - - - - - - - -
N 3882 3209 2419 2307 - - - - - - - -
Older Peers' Instrumented Div Var - - - - 1.081*** 1.469*** 0.488* 1.166** - - - -
- - - - (5.102) (3.574) (1.874) (2.242) - - - -
N - - - - 3575 2997 2571 2356 - - - -
Younger Peers' Instrumented Div Var - - - - 1.541*** 1.303*** -0.890 1.465 - - - -
- - - - (4.485) (3.133) (-0.232) (1.016) - - - -
N - - - - 3561 2996 2497 2336 - - - -
More Tangible Peers' Instrumented Div Var - - - - - - - - 1.063*** 1.310*** 0.649** 1.110***
- - - - - - - - (3.512) (3.703) (2.056) (2.719)
N - - - - - - - - 3196 2948 3025 2554
Less Tangible Peers' Instrumented Div Var - - - - - - - - 0.937*** 1.074*** 0.413 0.975**
- - - - - - - - (3.168) (3.783) (0.809) (2.577)
N - - - - - - - - 3192 2960 2958 2520
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
This table describes the main variables used in the paper. Peer firm averages of variables are calculated as the average of all firms 
within an industry-year combination, excluding the ith observation. Industries are defined by the TWSE Stock Industry Category. 
All the variables have been winsorised at the 5th and 95th percentile level. All the data used in this paper is obtained from Factset 
and Bloomberg. 
Variable Definition 
Dividend Payer A firm is a payer in year t if it has positive dividends per share, and takes value of 
one. A firm is a non-payer and takes value of zero otherwise. 
Dividend Payout Dividends per share divided by Earnings per share 
Dividends-to-Assets (or Div/Assets) Total Cash Dividends paid to common shareholders divided by Total Assets 
Return on Assets Net Income divided by two fiscal period average of Total Assets 
Return on Equity Net Income divided by two fiscal period average of Total Shareholders' Equity 
Asset Growth 1-year One-year growth rate (in percentage terms) of Total Assets 
Book-to-Equity Book value divided by Equity value of company 
Market Capitalisation Logarithm of the Market Value which is calculated as Price multiplied by Common 
shares outstanding 
Total Sales Logarithm of Total Sales of Goods and Services earned from the company's core and 
recurring operations, reduced by cash and trade discounts, allowance for sales return 
and pass-through taxes such as sales and excise taxes. 
Long-term Debt to Equity Long-term Debt as a percent of Common Equity 
Total Debt to Total Capital Total Debt as a percent of Total Capital 
Idiosyncratic Equity Risk Residuals are first calculated from five-year rolling regressions of monthly stock 
returns on estimated loadings on Fama-French and Carhart factors and industry 
average excess returns. Logarithm of the standard deviation of the one-year residuals 
is then obtained. 
Net Tangibility Net Tangible Assets as a percent of Total Assets 
Firm Age Logarithm of the age of the firm from date of incorporation 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the industry and 
then summing the resulting numbers. 
Industry Lerner Index Total industry sales divided by industry total operational expenses. 
Industry Average Analyst Coverage Average monthly number of earnings estimates a firm in the industry receive over the 
fiscal year. 
Industry Average Dispersion in 
Analysts' Forecasts 
Calculated as the average of the standard deviation of analysts' earnings forecasts 
divided by the previous year share price for firms in the industry. 
Repurchase yield Total Funds used to decrease common and preferred stock outstanding divided by 
Total Market Value 
Total Shareholder Return Total Cash Dividends paid to common shareholders and Total Funds used to decrease 
common and preferred stock outstanding 
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Appendix B: Further Work on Share Buybacks and Dividend as Total Payout Policy 
The main of this paper has deliberately not included share buybacks as part of its investigation for a few reasons. Firstly, stock 
repurchases were prohibited before 19 July 2000, while major restrictions were imposed on its use after the date. Secondly, when 
the Securities Exchange Act Rule 28-2 relaxed its prohibition on share buybacks, it explained that one of the reasons for doing so 
was to help companies attract and retain talented employees. However by the beginning of January 2008, the Taiwanese 
government had ruled that bonuses of employees are now to be treated as an expense. This is widely believed to have materially 
impacted companies’ buyback decision. Thirdly, even today stock repurchase remains an infrequent payout policy tool used by 
companies, and only about 17% of our firm-year observations indicate share repurchases. While not within the scope of this paper 
and bearing in mind the caveats highlighted above, we present the results of some of the initial work that we have done investigating 
the influence of peers on the share repurchase policies of companies, as well as the proportion of dividends to total shareholder 
return in the table below. We find that peer influence is not a significant determinant of corporate buyback and total payout policies. 
Table VI: Peer Effects in Buyback and Dividend Policy: Structural Estimates 
The sample consists of all the firms listed on the Taiwan Capitalization Weighted Stock (TAIEX) Index between 1995 and 2017 
with non-missing data for all analysis variables.  The table presents two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimated coefficients, with 
the t-statistics shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is indicated at the top of each column. The endogenous variable is 
the peer firm average of the dependent variable. The instrument is the one-year-lagged peer firm average idiosyncratic equity 
risk. Peer Firm Averages denote variables constructed as the average of all firms within an industry-year combination, excluding 
the ith observation, and are lagged 1 year relative to the dependent variable. Industries are defined by the TWSE Stock Industry 
Category. Firm-Specific Factors denote variables corresponding to firm i’s value in year t. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels are denoted by *, ** and *** respectively. 
  Repurchase yield Dividends-to-Total Shareholder Return 
Peer firm averages   
Dependent Variable 1.912 0.788 
  (1.361) (0.899) 
Return on Assets -0.012 -0.006 
  (-0.528) (-0.545) 
Asset Growth 1-year 0.007 -0.001 
  (0.973) (-0.730) 
Market Capitalisation 0.019 -0.015 
  (0.405) (-0.535) 
Long-term Debt to Equity -0.002 0.001 
  (-0.577) (0.387) 
Firm-specific factors   
Idiosyncratic Equity Risk -0.032 -0.028*** 
  (-1.618) (-3.920) 
Return on Assets 0.000 0.016*** 
  (-0.060) (22.796) 
Asset Growth 1-year -0.002*** 0.002*** 
  (-6.133) (7.751) 
Market Capitalisation -0.005 0.014*** 
  (-0.941) (4.404) 
Long-term Debt to Equity -0.001** -0.001*** 
  (-2.206) (-5.027) 
    
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
    
Total no. of observations 10321 9681 
 
